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SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES CHALLENGES TO SOVEREIGNTY - A U.S. PERSPECTIVE
Richard0. Cunningham
I. INTRODUCION

As I look back over the thirty years during which I have practiced international trade law, the change in U.S. policy toward resolution of international trade disputes has been truly remarkable. When I began practicing in
this area, it was inconceivable that the United States would commit the final
resolution of trade issues to a multilateral or plurilateral body.
In those simpler days, it was almost invariably the practice of the United
States to try to resolve its own trade problems. Most of these were problems
encountered by U.S. industries in competition with imports in the U.S. market. Such issues were dealt with under U.S. law: anti-dumping, countervailing duties, Section 201, Section 406, and Section 337. Where problems were
encountered in foreign markets (market access, intellectual property, standards, etc.), the United States used Section 301, with the threat and/or actuality of trade retaliation used to lever an agreement with (in most cases, a
capitulation by) the "offending" foreign government.
True, there was a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and
the United States did, in fact, use GATT mechanisms from time to time to
address trade issues whose locus was in markets outside the United States.
However, there were at least two major reasons why multilateral dispute
resolution under the GATT appeared less than satisfactory to most U.S. industries and government trade policymakers. First, the GATT disciplines
were imprecise in many areas critical to the United States. For example, the
GATT only prohibited export subsidies. Domestic subsidies were very
vaguely defined and were explicitly said to be permissible, provided that the
GATT Member took care to avoid causing "adverse effects," also loosely
defined. A second major problem was that the GATT dispute resolution process was uncertain to produce results. A recommendation by a GATT panel
could be blocked by a GATT Member, even by the party against whom the
recommendation was made. Indeed, the United States itself occasionally

* Richard Cunningham is a partner in the law firm of Steptoe & Johnson in Washington,
D.C.
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blocked panel reports. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the U.S. approach to trade dispute resolution centered on various forms of unilateralism.
How different things seem today! Now, when you have a problem with
unfair practices in foreign markets, the adjudication of your case is likely to
be done by a World Trade Organization (WTO) or North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) panel. Even proceedings seeking relief from
import competition - under the anti-dumping or countervailing duty laws, or
even under Section 201 - may lead to a challenge of U.S. import restrictions
before a WTO or NAFTA panel. And, believe it or not, the United States has
given up the power to block those panel determinations.
Clearly there has been a substantial shift in U.S. policy. Increasingly,
unilateralism is being supplanted by a resort to supranational dispute resolution mechanisms. In effect, concerns over loss of sovereignty seem to have
diminished significantly.
Why has all this happened? How are the plurilateral and multilateral dispute resolution mechanisms working? Will these concessions of trade sovereignty to supranational bodies last in the face of domestic U.S. political reaction? And - in the final analysis - will this be good or bad for U.S. economic
and trade interests?
Those are the issues I want to address today. But first, let me give a brief
overview of these new trade dispute resolution mechanisms under NAFTA
and the WTO.
II. ENTRUSTING TRADE DISPUTE RESOLUTION TO SUPRANATIONAL
PROCESSES - NAFrA AND THE WTO

Under both NAFTA and the WTO, the United States has agreed to submit
broad categories of international trade disputes to binding resolution under a
process involving compulsory consultations, followed, if necessary, by a
largely adjudicative procedure before a panel of trade experts. Indeed, under
both regimes, a dispute over an issue covered by WTO (or NAFTA, as the
case may be) disciplines is required to be resolved through these dispute
resolution procedures.' Since both NAFTA and the WTO cover most of the
basic categories of trade issues, the net effect is that most U.S. claims of foreign unfair trade practices are now subject to these supranational procedures.
Perhaps most surprising to anyone who has practiced in this area over the
past several decades is the fact that decisions under the two major U.S. import relief laws - anti-dumping and countervailing duties - can now be
overturned by non-blockable panel decisions under both NAFrA and the
I See NAFTA, art. 2005 (a dispute arising under both NAF'A and WTO disciplines
"may be settled in either forum at the discretion of the complaining Party").
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WTO. Needless to say, this was the most controversial concession of sovereignty in the political trade debate that raged around these arguments.
While the NAFTA and WTO dispute resolution processes are similar in
many ways, there are differences of some significance.
A. Dispute Settlement Procedures Under NAFTA Chapter 20
The overall operation of NAFTA is governed by a Free Trade Commission (FTC), which is composed of "cabinet-level representatives of the Parties or their designees, ' 2 by a set of Committees and Working Groups,3 and
by a Secretariat of three Sections corresponding to the three Member countries. Within this structure, dispute settlement procedures involve consultation, then consideration of the issue by the FTC, and finally (if necessary)
resolution by a five-member arbitral panel. The Chapter 20 dispute settlement procedures are intended to cover all disputes between two or more of
the Member countries concerning:
" interpretation or application of the Agreement,
an actual or proposed measure by one Party deemed by another
Party to be inconsistent with the Agreement, or
*

* an actual or proposed measure by one Party that, although not itself
inconsistent with the Agreement, is deemed by another Party to nullify or impair its benefits under provisions of the Agreement dealing
with trade in goods (except automotive or energy investment issues),
5
technical barriers to trade, trade in services, or intellectual property.

The process begins with a request for consultations, which must be commenced within fifteen days. 6 If no resolution is reached within fifteen days,
the complaining Party may request that a meeting of the FTC be held within
ten days.7 If the FTC cannot resolve the dispute within a further thirty days,
any Party to the dispute may call for an arbitral panel. 8 Panelists in Chapter
20 proceedings are drawn from a standing roster of thirty experts in issues
relevant to the Agreement.9 Each panel is made up of five panelists. First, the
2

NAFTA, art. 2001

3 Id., annex 2001.2.
4 Id., art. 2002.

Id., art. 2004 and annex 2004.
Id., art 2006.
7 Id., art. 2007.
8 NAFTA, art. 2008.
9 Id., art. 2009.
5

6
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disputing Parties must agree on a chair (failing agreement, one Party is selected by lot to choose the chair). Then, each Party selects two panelists who
are citizens of the other Party. In considering the dispute, the panel may
obtain the advice of experts or of a scientific review board.' 2 Chapter 20
panel proceedings are expeditious. The panel's initial report is made within
ninety days, after which Parties may submit comments within fourteen
days.'143 The final report is to be issued within thirty days after the initial report.

The effect of a final panel report might be described as mandatory, but
with one last shot at negotiation. Upon receipt of the report, the disputing
parties "shall agree on the resolution of the dispute, which normally shall
conform with the determinations and recommendations of the panel."' 5 The
preferred 16resolution is non-implementation or removal of the offending
measure. However, if a resolution cannot be agreed upon within thirty days,
the complaining Party may suspend NAFTA benefits in an amount equivalent to the adverse effect of the offending measure, and may maintain such
suspension until such time as a resolution is agreed upon.
It is worth noting that Chapter 20 is somewhat more flexible than the
WTO with regard to suspension of benefits. While there is a stated preference for suspension of benefits in the same sector as that affected by the offending measure, a complaining Party may suspend benefits in other sectors
where it "considers it is not practicable or effective to suspend benefits in the
same sector."' 8 And while the amount of benefits suspended is subject to
review by a panel, the amount will be sustained unless it is "manifestly excessive.
B. WTO - The Uruguay Round Understanding on Dispute Settlement
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is best understood as the
necessary corollary to the grand vision of the United States of the Uruguay

10Id., art 2011.
I Id., art. 2014.
12 Id., art. 2015.
13 Id., art. 2016.
14 NAFTA, art. 2017, para.
1.
15 Id., art. 2018, para. 1.
16 Id., art. 2018, para. 2.
17 Id.,art. 2019, para. 1.
18 Id., art. 2019, para.
2.
19 Id., art. 2019, para.
3.
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Round negotiations.20 The U.S. negotiators went to great lengths to shape the
Round as an effort to create sweeping new rules of fair trade, rules covering
such diverse issues as agriculture, subsidies, sanitary/phytosanitary measures,
services, intellectual property, and investment. Most of these new disciplines
involved sales by U.S. firms and investments in non-U.S. markets and, thus,
did not lend themselves to enforcement by U.S. import restrictions. Therefore, to make the new disciplines meaningful - and to make them worth the
negotiating price of accepting some restrictions on the ability of the United
States to impose anti-dumping and countervailing duties - it was necessary
to craft an international enforcement mechanism. Thus, the DSU was born.
In the new WTO, settlement of disputes is conferred on a standing organization known as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 21 While an elaborate and binding panel process is set up under the DSB (as discussed below),
it should be recognized that the WTO continues the former GATT's emphasis on the importance of negotiated resolutions. Consultations are required as
the first step in any dispute, and Members are adjured "to accord sympathetic
consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for consultation."2 One
Member must respond within ten days to another Member's request for consultations and must enter into consultations within thirty days after receiving
such a request.2 Moreover, the disputing Members may at any time request
(or the Director-General may offer) good offices, conciliation, or
mediation. 24
However, if consultations do not resolve the dispute within sixty days
from the request for such consultations, the complaining Member may request the establishment of a panel,2 5 which is established at the next DSB
meeting.2 The DSB maintains an "indicative list" of panelists, 27 but panelists
need not be chosen from that list. A panel will consist of three panelists unless the disputing Members agree to have five panelists. Panelists will be

20

GATT - Multilateral Trade Negotiaions (The Uruguay Round): Understanding on

Rules & Procedures Goveming the Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 LL.M. 112

[hereinafter DSU].
21

DSU, art. 2.

22 Id., art. 4, para. 2.

Id. There is a specific DSU within the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, under which the timetables are somewhat different from those of the general DSU.
See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Sept. 27, 1994, 1994 WL 761793
(G.A.T.T.) [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
24 DSU, art. 5.
25 Id., art. 4, para. 7.
27 Id.,art.
27 Id., art. 6.
8, para. 4.
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proposed by the WTO Secretariat
and may not be opposed by the Parties
"except for compelling reasons., 28
Once a panel is established and panelists are selected, Annex 3 to the
DSU spells out fairly detailed rules for the consideration of the case and for
written and oral presentation by the Parties. The panel may also pose its own
informational requests to the Parties and may seek information from other
persons or sources. 29 The normal duration of a panel proceeding is twentythree to thirty-four weeks from the commencement of proceedings. A final
report is to be issued within six months, unless the panel informs the DSB of
reasons why further time
31 is needed, in which case the deadline may be extended to nine months.
In a sharp departure from the former GATT rules, a panel report may no
longer be blocked by an objecting Member. Objections may be submitted to
the DSB, 32 but a panel report "shall be adopted at a DSB meeting" within
sixty days after its circulation among WTO Members, unless a Party notifies
the DSB of its intention to appeal or the "DSB decides by consensus not to
adopt the report."3 Review by the Standing Appellate Body is normally
completed within sixty days, with a ninety-day maximum limit.
Where the ultimate result (panel report or decision of Standing Appellate
Body) finds a Member's measure not to be in compliance with WTO obligations, "it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into
conformity" with its obligations and ma, also "suggest war's
in which the
3
recommendations."
the
implement
could
concerned
Member
Within thirty days after adoption of a final panel report or after a Standing Appellate Body decision, a Member is to report to the DSB on its intentions with respect to compliance. "If it is impracticable to comply immediately," a Member may be given "a reasonable time," determined on the basis
of its own proposal, by agreement by Parties to the dispute, or by a decision
reached in binding arbitration. As to the latter, the DSU provides as a guideline that the "reasonable time" should not exceed fifteen months. 36 If the
28
29

30
31
32

Id., art. 8, para. 6.
Id.,art. 13.
DSU, annex 3, para. 12.
Id., art. 12, para. 8,9.
Id., art. 16, par. 2.

Id., art. 16, para. 4.
Id., art. 17, para. 5.
Id., art. 19, para. 1. In the area of subsidies, the SCM Agreement is somewhat more
explicit, authorizing the panel to direct that the Member "withdraw" the subsidy and/or take
steps to eliminate the subsidy's adverse effects on the complaining Member. See SCM
Agreement, art. 7.8.
36 DSU, art. 21, par. 3.
33
34
35
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complaining Member has concerns as to the measures adopted to comply
with the ruling, it may reconvene the original panel for a ninety-day consideration.37
Where the losing Member does not take conforming measures, the DSU
provides for a negotiation between the Parties as to trade compensation. Such
negotiation is to be completed not less than twenty days after the end of the
above-discussed "reasonable period" for implementing conforming measures. Failing success in such negotiation, the complaining Party may request
authority to suspend WTO concessions or obligations. In this regard, the
following is the order of preference for such compensatory measures:
(1) [In] the same sector. In the case of trade in goods, "sector"
means all goods; in the case of trade in services, it means a "principal" services sector, and in the case of intellectual property rights, it
means certain categories of IPR as defined in the TRIPS
Agreement;39 or
(2) [A] different sector under the same WTO Agreement; or
(3) [C]oncessions or other obligations under another WTO Agreement. 40
The level of such compensatory measures is to be equal to the level of the
nullification or impairment caused by the offending Member's act or practice.41
C. NAFTA and WTO Challenges To Anti-dumping and Countervailing
Duty Decisions
In the area of U.S. trade sovereignty, the ability to take import relief
measures under the anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws is by far the
most politically sensitive issue. Under both NAFTA and the WTO, the
United States has agreed to procedures by which a supranational panel may
rule that a countervailing duty or anti-dumping order was improperly
reached. The NAFTA and WTO procedures differ fundamentally from each
other, however, and the differences between them say much about the evolution of U.S. policy on the issue of trade sovereignty.
37

39

Id., art. 21, para. 5.

Id., art 22, para. 2.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 I.L.M. 1223

[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
40
41

DSU, art. 12, para. 3.
Id., art. 12, para. 4.

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 24.103 1998

1. NAFTA Chapter 19
The NAFTA approach to plurilateral review of anti-dumping and countervailing duty decisions has its genesis in the predecessor U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement (FTA). In the FTA negotiations, it will be recalled, Canadian negotiators advanced the concept of a true single market, in which antidumping and countervailing duty enforcement between the two nations
would be phased out. That concept was politically unmarketable in the
United States, to put it mildly. As a consequence, the negotiators sought a
binational panel review mechanism to curb what the Canadian side saw as
excesses and unfairness in U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing duty interpretations.
The U.S. FTA negotiators, however, steadfastly refused to subject U.S.
anti-dumping and countervailing duty rulings to any supranational standards.
The most they would accept - to which the Canadian side ultimately agreed
- was a regime in which a binational panel would review U.S. anti-dumping
and countervailing decisions, but in which the standards of review would be
whether U.S. law was properly applied and interpreted. In effect, the supranational panel would perform the same function as a U.S. reviewing court.
That concept is now embodied in NAFTA Chapter 19, which announces
at the outset that ". . . each Party shall replace judicial review of final antidumping and countervailing duty determinations with binational panel review." Such review of anti-dumping and countervailing duty determinations is to be "based on the administrative record," and its purpose is ". .. to
determine whether such determination was in accordance with the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the importing Party." 43 The standard
of review is that which is applied by a court as specified in the law of each of
the three NAFTA countries, 44 and the general legal principles of the importing country are also incorporated into the process.
Every facet of NAFTA Chapter 19 also reinforces the point that these are
not dispute resolution procedures in the consultation-oriented sense of the
WTO DSU or NAFTA Chapter 20. Rather, these are judicial exercises, with
a few arbitration-like characteristics. Thus the roster of panelists "shall include judges or former judges to the fullest extent possible. "' 46 From that
roster, each Party selects two panelists - in consultation with the opposing
Party and with four preemptory challenges - and then the Parties must agree
42

NAFTA, art. 1904, para. 1.

43 Id., art. 1904, para.
2.
44 Id., art.1904, para. 3 and annex 1911.
45 Id., art. 1904, para.
46

3.
Id., annex 1901.2, para. 1.
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on a fifth panelist.47 A decision must be reached by a majority of the panelists, and is accompanied by a written analysis of the reasons, together with
dissents and concurrences, if any.48
A final panel decision in a Chapter 19 review is "binding on the involved
Parties with respect to the particular matter." 49 As will be discussed later,
U.S. administering authorities have interpreted this language to mean that a
panel determination has no precedential effect beyond the administrative
proceeding examined by the panel.
Finally, a limited form of appeal from an adverse panel decision is provided in Article 1904, paragraph 9, denominated an "extraordinary challenge." Such a challenge must be based on one of three grounds:
* a panel Member "was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or a seof interest, or otherwise materially violated the rules of
rious conflict
's
conduct,"
* the panel

"seriously departed from a rule of procedure," or

the panel "manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction set out in this Article,'51
for example by failing to apply the apreview.
of
standard
propriate
*

In short, the NAFTA Chapter 19 process represents a very limited yielding of sovereignty in the anti-dumping/countervailing duty context. While it
is true that a supranational body can overturn a U.S. administrative decision,
it can do so only on the basis of inconsistency with U.S. law and its decision
has no precedential impact on other U.S. anti-dumping or countervailing duty
proceedings.
2. WTO Challenges to U.S. Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty
Decisions
In the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the United
States was faced with a radically different negotiating challenge. In a very
real sense, the U.S. negotiators found themselves hoist on their own petards.
47 Id., annex 1901.2, para. 2,
3.
43 NAFTA, annex 1901.2, para. 4.

49 Id., art. 1904, para.9.
50 Such misconduct was alleged in an extraordinary challenge lodged by the U.S. side
in
one of the panel proceedings in the Softwood Lumber countervailing duty litigation - surely
the darkest episode of Chapter 19 advocacy. See In Re Certain Softwood Lumber Products
from Canada, ECC-94-1904-01 USA (Appeal of USA-92-1904-01) (Aug. 3, 1994).
51 NAFTA, art. 1904, para.
9.
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Having set out to establish a broad range of fair trading disciplines and a
binding Dispute Settlement Understanding to enforce those new disciplines,
the United States could hardly contend that the same binding DSU should not
be applied to challenges of anti-dumping and countervailing duty decisions.
Moreover, many of our trading partners saw the creation of some discipline
on U.S. anti-dumping/countervailing duty enforcement as the quid pro quo
for accepting the subsidy, market access, agricultural, and other disciplines
demanded of them by the U.S. side.
Nor was it possible for U.S. negotiators to insist - as they had done in the
FTA and NAFTA negotiations - that U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing
duty decisions should be reviewed only for consistency with U.S. law. Almost every other voice in the negotiations was demanding an international
standard of fair anti-dumping/countervailing duty enforcement. The only
viable strategy for the United States, therefore, was to agree to subject antidumping and countervailing duty decisions to WTO dispute settlement and to
WTO Codes on anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures, and to try to
make those Codes reflect U.S. anti-dumping/countervailing duty law and
practice as closely as possible. The U.S. negotiators were largely - but by no
means totally - successful in this approach.
The result in the WTO, then, was that the United States succeeded in
limiting the threat to its anti-dumping and countervailing duty practices by
incorporating most of those practices into the WTO Codes. However, it was
forced to concede the sovereignty issue. Henceforth, U.S. import relief decisions - like other trade issues - could be taken to the WTO for dispute resolution under international criteria.
I. U.S. TRADE POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF DIMINISHED SOVEREIGNTY IN
TRADE DIsPUTES

The evolution of U.S. policy toward concessions of trade sovereignty to
supranational bodies reflects a realization on the part of U.S. policymakers
that U.S. trade interests are increasingly focused on exports to, and investments in, markets outside the United States. The corollary of that realization
is that it is important to enhance the ability to address foreign governmental
practices - subsidies, access barriers, investment restrictions - that U.S. f'rms
encounter outside the United States, even if a consequence is that the United
States must accept some supranational discipline on its ability to restrict what
it regards as unfair (dumped or subsidized) imports.
The policy choice the United States made in the Uruguay Round negotiations was to move away from a unilateral approach to foreign market unfair
practices - an approach which said to foreign governments, "Abandon your
practice that we regard as unfair, or we will restrict your exports to the
United States." That approach, using Section 301 as the main tool, had gen-
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erated increasing friction with our trading partners, for two reasons. First, it
was seen as a derogation of serious magnitude from the professed policy of
the United States supporting the GATT system - in short, it was pure brute
force unilateralism. Second, in many cases the United States was taking action against foreign practices that the international trading community had
not defined as "unfair."
This shift in policy to increased "supranationalization of trade disputes
poses two major trade policy issues for the United States. On the "trade offensive" side, is the ability of the United States to address unfair practices in
foreign markets enhanced or lessened? On the "defensive" side, how much
new constraint is placed on the ability of the United States to protect domestic industries from injurious dumped or subsidized imports? While there are
clearly pluses and minuses on both issues, this observer is guardedly optimistic that on balance U.S. trade interests will be advanced by the shift away
from unilateralism.
A. The Effect on the U.S. Ability To Address Unfair Practices Encountered
in Foreign Markets
This policy issue may be divided into two interrelated questions:
* To

what extent will NAFTA Chapter 20 and the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding be effective vehicles for addressing the
trade problems encountered by U.S. industries in foreign markets?
* As to trade issues for which the WTO and NAFTA do not provide adequate remedies, can the United States still take effective
unilateral action?
With respect to the first issue, it is undeniable that the substantive disciplines in most of the important areas of potential trade dispute are greatly
expanded and clarified by both the WTO Agreements and by NAFTA.
Moreover, with one major exception, the United States has had a high success rate in its early cases using the new WTO dispute resolution mechanism
against foreign practices violative of those WTO disciplines.52 Thus, as to
practices covered by the new disciplines, which are engaged in by NAFTA or
WTO Members, the early results suggest strongly that the new dispute reso-

52 The major exception, of course, was the rejection by a WTO panel of the U.S. case

against Japan alleging market access barriers in the photographic film market. See Japan Measures Affecting Consumer PhotographicFilm and Paper, (WT/DS44/R, Dec. 6, 1997)
[hereinafter Film].
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lution mechanisms have enhanced the ability of the United States to address
unfair practices in foreign markets.
The more serious question is whether the United States has deprived itself
of the ability to act unilaterally to protect its trade interests against unfair
foreign practices not covered under NAFTA or the WTO. This question is
multifaceted, and the returns are not all in yet.
At the outset, it should be noted that there is no impediment under the
WTO or NAFTA to taking unilateral action against the unfair trade practices
of a non-Member country. This is significant because countries that have not
joined the WTO or NAFTA may not have conformed their laws and practices
to the disciplines of these Agreements.
More difficult problems are posed where a grievance by the United States
against a NAFTA or WTO Member relates to a practice considered unfair by
the United States, but not covered by the NAFTA or WTO substantive disciplines. Were the United States unilaterally to take trade retaliation measures
in such a circumstance, it would itself be committing a NAFTA and/or WTO
violation. The aggrieved Member would presumably bring a case to a WTO
(or NAFTA Chapter 20) panel, and the United States would not be able to
block a panel decision finding its trade retaliation to be inconsistent with its
WTO (or NAFTA) obligations.
In testifying before the Senate Commerce Committee on June 16, 1994 in
support of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) legislation, thenUSTR Mickey Kantor took the aggressive position that there is no problem at
all in taking unilateral action under Section 30153 against an unfair practice
not covered by WTO disciplines:
Some countries have even tried to claim that the WTO will restrict
the ability of the United States to use Section 301 because it requires
a Member to abide by the DSU rules and procedures when it seeks to
redress a violation of the WTO. There is, however, absolutely no basis for such a claim. Since 1979, Section 301 has required the Trade
Representative to resort to the dispute settlement provisions of the
GATT if a Section 301 investigation involved a GATT agreement.
The DSU will, therefore, make no changes in the way the United
States conducts Section 301 investigations. Section 301 will also remain fully available to address unfair practices that are not covered
by the WTO or GATT or that are committed by non-WTO members.
As in the past, such investigations will not involve recourse to mul53 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 301-09,
88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975),
amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107, 1164 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-19 (1988)) [hereinafter "Section 301].
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tilateral dispute settlement procedures. Moreover, the mere fact that
the Uruguay Round Agreements treat a particular subject matter such as intellectual property rights - does not mean that the Trade
Representative must initiate DSU proceedings in every Section 301
investigation involving that subject
matter. In the event that the
actions of the foreign government in question fall outside the disciplines of those agreements, the Section 301 investigation would proceed without recourse to DSU procedure ....
There is no basis for concern that the Uruguay Round Agreements in
general, or the DSU in particular, will make future Administrations
more reluctant to apply Section 301 sanctions that may be inconsistent with U.S. trade obligations because such sanctions could engender DSU-authorized counter-retaliation. Just as the United States
may now choose to take Section 301 actions that are not GATTauthorized, governments that are the subject of such actions may
choose to respond in kind. That situation will not change under the
Uruguay Round Agreements. The risk of counter-retaliation under
the GATT has not prevented the United States from taking unauthorized actions in connection with such matters as semiconductors,
pharmaceuticals, beer, and hormone-treated beef. 4
In practice, the United States has not been quite so bold. Consider, for
example, the effort of Eastman Kodak under Section 301 against the Japanese government's alleged toleration of and complicity in a set of essentially
private anti-competitive practices that Kodak claimed constituted a denial of
access by foreign competitors to Japan's photographic film market. 55 A year
of negotiations under threat of unilateral trade retaliation failed to produce a
negotiated resolution, and the U.S. side was forced to decide whether to take
unilateral action. They blinked. Instead of trade retaliation, the USTR chose
to recast the allegations as WTO violations, downplaying the concept of government toleration of private anticompetitive conduct and emphasizing instead allegations that government actions in and of themselves constituted
market access barriers. Ultimately,
however, a WTO panel ruled against the
6
United States on every claim.
54 Testimony of Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, before the Senate Committee

on Commerce, June 16, 1994.
55 See Film, supra note
52.
5 Interestingly, the USTR is continuing to pursue the case in a creative
way. They have
characterized numerous statements made by Japan in the course of the WTO proceeding as
"commitments" to an open film market and have set up a process of "monitoring" Japan's
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Just a few weeks ago, the USTR took a different approach to an issue
similar in many ways to that raised in the Japan film case. U.S. exporters of
high fructose corn syrup (the principal sweetener in most countries' production of soft drinks) complained that the Mexican government had given explicit approval to an anticompetitive agreement between Mexico's sugar industry and its soft drink bottling industry. The gist of the agreement was that
the bottlers would limit their purchases of high fructose corn syrup (principally supplied by U.S. imports), using Mexican sugar instead. In return, the
sugar producers gave certain undertakings on pricing. The effect, the U.S.
corn syrup exporters complained under Section 301, was an "unreasonable
practice burdening U.S. trade." The Section 301 petition crafted by the industry in cooperation with USTR attorneys, led to USTR's initiation of an
investigation in early May 1998. 57
The Mexican corn syrup case represents a deliberate decision to address
this problem bilaterally (with potential unilateral retaliation), rather than under WTO or NAFTA dispute resolution. The key to this strategy is the nature
of the potential retaliation. The petitioners and the USTR contemplate that, if
no negotiated resolution can be achieved, retaliation would be accomplished
by means not violative of WTO obligations.
This non-violation retaliation approach has been used successfully by the
USTR in other contexts. For example, when the USTR wished to pressure
certain foreign governments to improve their offers in the international telecommunications negotiations, it arranged with the Federal Communications
Commission to hold up approval of.license applications by telecommunications companies from those countries. Since this was not a trade restriction in
violation of any WTO discipline, the affected foreign government had no
recourse to a WTO DSU remedy. At least in the case of one foreign government, the tactic worked.
There remains some role for U.S. unilateral action under Section 301,
albeit less ambitious than was suggested in Ambassador Kantor's testimony.
Section 301 is, after all, first and foremost, a vehicle for the negotiated resolution of trade problems. From the standpoint of the petitioning U.S. industry, unilateral U.S. retaliation is not the desired result. Such retaliation has a
role primarily as leverage for negotiations. And such leverage can still exist,
through threat of non-WTO-violative action or - in rare cases - the threat
that the United States might take unilateral action and accept any resulting
WTO measures.
"adherence" to those "commitments." Whether this novel approach yields market-opening
results remains to be seen.
57 Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS)
From the
United States, Sept. 15, 1997, WT/DS101/1, 1997 WL 570768.
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Thus viewed, the effects of the move away from unilateralism toward
plurilateral and multilateral dispute resolution should be strongly beneficial
to U.S. efforts to address foreign unfair practices. The new WTO and
NAFTA disciplines and unblockable dispute settlement procedures are a
major new weapon in the trade arsenal. And, where the WTO or NAFTA
processes are not adequate, recourse to Section 301 bilateral negotiations
under a carefully crafted threat of unilateral retaliation remains available in
appropriate cases.
B. Impact on U.S. Import Relief Laws
In the view of many who opposed the U.S. adoption of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, the concern that loomed largest was that U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty decisions would be subjected in a new and
totally different way to challenge under WTO dispute resolution. The concern arises, of course, because it is no longer possible for the United States to
"block" an unfavorable WTO panel recommendation by refusing to allow it
to be adopted. Therefore, the United States will, in the event that a panel
finds a U.S. countervailing or anti-dumping decision inconsistent with WTO
standards, either change that decision or suffer trade retaliation.
The concern over such non-blockable panel decisions is not exclusively
procedural. It relates equally to a fear that consistent criticisms by other
countries of U.S anti-dumping and countervailing duty practice as being
overly draconian will be reflected in equally hostile panel decisions. While
such concerns cannot be dismissed lightly, four points should-be noted.
First, even if the United States loses a case in the dispute resolution process, it is not required to change the anti-dumping or countervailing duty decision. It may instead choose to let the decision stand and accept trade retaliation or negotiate a resolution with the other Member or Members. In regard
to retaliation, it should be remembered that in most cases retaliation (or negotiated trade compensation) does not involve the same product covered by
the countervail case. Thus, the U.S. industry protected by the anti-dumping
or countervailing duty will probably not be affected by the retaliation.
Second, the U.S. Congress has threatened to monitor panel results and to
consider withdrawal from the WTO in the event that panels repeatedly render
decisions against the United States that we conclude to be unjustifiable. This
will surely put pressure on the panels.
Third, the concern that the hostility of foreign governments to U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty practices will be reflected in the view by
panelists may not be well-founded. Panelists tend not to be government trade
policy officials, but rather, they tend to be experts - lawyers, judges, academics - chosen from countries not involved in the disputes. Moreover, the
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WTO system seeks choices of panelists acceptable to all Parties to the proceeding.
Finally, it should be noted that the U.S. Department of Commerce and the
International Trade Commission accord limited precedential value to WTO
and NAFTA panel decisions. Wherever possible, panel decisions are viewed
as binding only with respect to the particular case in which the decision is
rendered. In subsequent cases, both agencies are strongly inclined to continue
to apply the WTO-rejected policy unless the panel's decision is so explicit
that a change in administrative practice cannot be avoided.
This is not to say, of course, that the new unblockable dispute resolution
procedures will have no effect whatsoever on U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing duty enforcement. In the view of this observer, however, the principal impact will not come through panel reversals of Commerce Department
or International Trade Commission decisions. Rather, the two administering
agencies - especially the Commerce Department - are likely in some cases to
be more cautious in their analysis in order to craft decisions and practices
that will not be vulnerable to WTO (or, to a lesser extent, a NAFTA) challenge. For example, the Commerce Department is understood to have abandoned certain aspects of its "grants methodology" for calculating the value of
capital subsidies, specifically out of concern that the methodology might not
withstand WTO panel scrutiny. However, such increased caution by the administering agencies would seem to be a positive development.
IV. POSTSCRIPT - A PERSONAL OBSERVATION
The shift away from unilateralism toward multilateral and plurilateral
dispute resolution will be, on balance, substantially beneficial to U.S. trade
policy. In particular, objective and binding processes for enforcing the expanded and better-defined trade disciplines of NAFTA and the WTO must be
constructive for a U.S. economy whose trade concerns are increasingly focused on trade and investment access to foreign markets, rather than on import protection measures.
One issue remains troubling, however - the reluctance to date of the U.S.
business community to actively pursue its new, enhanced trade remedies.
Historically, the volume of import protection cases has dramatically outstripped the trickle of cases focused on market access, investment barriers,
and other unfair practices in foreign markets. One would have hoped that the
increased emphasis of U.S. companies on foreign markets, coupled with
much-improved NAFTA and WTO disciplines and effective dispute settlement procedures, would have changed all that. To date, it has not happened.
Whether in fact these new disciplines and dispute resolution procedures will
achieve the goals our negotiators envisioned will, in the long run, depend on
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whether U.S. businesses wake up to their potential. So far, that does not seem
to be happening.

